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REPEAT OFFENDERS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DANGEROUS SPECIAL OFFENDER ACT-United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 2629 (1976).
In 1970, under heavy nationwide pressure to take action against
the escalating crime problem, Congress passed the Organized Crime
Control Act.' Undoubtedly the most controversial new provision of
this Act is Title X of the Dangerous Special Offender Act, which
provides increased penalties for habitual or professional criminals
convicted of a triggering felony.2 It had generally been recognized
that a federal recidivist statute of this kind was long overdue. According to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence, the greatest proportion of all serious violence is committed by repeat offenders, accounting not only for a higher rate, but
also a greater degree of violence.' In drafting the Act, Congress made
4
use of the conclusions of many prestigious legal organizations,
whose studies had demonstrated that some form of increased sentencing for dangerous offenders was necessary not only to protect
the community, but also, to begin the process of reduction of prison
use as to non-dangerous offenders.
In contrast with these approving reports, the proposed Act met
with serious opposition in Congress by the American Civil Liberties
6
Union,5 by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and
1. 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1970):
Whenever an attorney charged with the prosecution of a defendant in a court of the
United States for an alleged felony committed when the defendant was over the age
of twenty-one years has reason to believe that the defendant is a dangerous special
offender such attorney, a reasonable time before trial or acceptance by the court of a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, may sign and file with the court, and may amend, a
notice (1) specifying that the defendant is a dangerous special offender who upon
conviction for such felony is subject to the imposition of a sentence under subsection
(b) of this section, and (2) setting out with particularity the reasons why such attorney
believes the defendant to be a dangerous special offender. In no case shall the fact that
the defendant is alleged to be a dangerous special offender be an issue upon the trial
of such felony, be disclosed to the jury, or be disclosed before any plea of guilty or nolo
contendere or verdict or finding of guilty to the presiding judge without the consent of
the parties.
3. 115 CONG. REC. 35, 546 (1969).
4. Title X is largely modeled on ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
AND PROCEDURES, § 3.1, § 3.3 (Approved Draft, 1968). It is also based on the MODEL SENTENCING ACT OF 1963, § 5-9 drafted by the Advisory Council of Judges of the Nat'l Council on Crime
and Delinquency, and on the MODEL SENTENCING AT § 3202, of the Nat'l Commission for
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. These model acts were quoted in appendices attached to
the court's opinion in United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 339-42 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 96 S.Ct. 2629 (1976).
5. Remarks of Lawrence Speiser for the A.C.L.U., Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 454 (1969).
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by a number of concerned congressmen.7 These groups raised difficult constitutional questions dealing with due process, vagueness,
double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment, and equal protection, as well as many evidentiary and policy problems. While the
bill appears to be a laudable attempt to remove a very dangerous
element in our society, a more careful examination reveals potential
pitfalls in its definitions and sentencing provisions.
The bill was passed in 1970 over many constitutional objections, but since that time Title X has rarely been invoked by the
Justice Department, perhaps because of uneasiness or lack of confidence in its acceptance by the courts. The result has been that the
issue of its constitutionality was not resolved in any United States
Circuit Court of Appeals until the Act was upheld by the Sixth
Circuit in United States v. Stewart.' Thus the Stewart case is of
significant legal interest, since it marks the government's first definitive court victory at the appeals court level, and may signal more
extensive use of the law by the Justice Department.
I.

FACTS OF THE CASE

On January 13, 1975, James Howard Stewart was charged in
the Eastern District Court of Kentucky with aiding and assisting
the escape of a co-defendant from the Bell County Jail in Pineville,
Kentucky. Six days before trial, the United States filed notices of
its intention to proceed against Stewart pursuant to the dangerous
special offender sentencing provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1),1'
6. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 N.D. LAW. 55 (1970), citing ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE
PROPOSED ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969 (S.30) (1970).
7. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 4007, 4070-91 (1970). An extensive counterattack
to these objections was made by one of the bill's leading proponents, Sen. John D. McClelland, The Organized Crime Act, supra note 6.
8. 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 2629 (1976). Section 3575 had been
tested at the district court level only four times before Stewart, but these cases were decided
on procedural deficiencies. See United States v. Holt, 397 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Texas 1975);
United States v. Edwards, 379 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Fla. 1974); United States v. Kelly, 384 F.
Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1974), af'd, 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Duardi,
384 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974), appeal dismissed, 514 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1975), aft 'd, 529
F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975). In Duardi and Holt, the courts were able to decide the cases before
them on grounds other than constitutionality. However, the Duardi court, supra at 885, gave
as an alternate holding, the unconstitutionality of the Act because of vagueness, after a
lengthy discussion of this point. On the other hand, the Holt court, supra at 1399, maintained
the Act's constitutionality.
9. 531 F.2d at 337-39, Appendix A.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (e)(1) (1970):
A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this section if-(1) the defendant has
previously been convicted in courts of the United States . . . for two or more offenses
committed on occasions different from one another and from such felony and punisha-
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the habitual offender section. The notice set out the required three
prior felony convictions. As proof that he was dangerous within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f)" and that additional imprisonment
was necessary to protect the community, the prosecution offered
evidence of additional pending felonies, poor institutional adjustment, and a history of violence both in and out of prison.
After an initial mistrial, Stewart pleaded guilty to count III of
the indictment in lieu of a retrial, and moved to dismiss the government's dangerous special offender notice. He alleged that the term
"dangerous," as used and defined in § 3575(f), and the provision for
an enhanced sentence "not disproportionate" to the instant felony
in § 3575(b), were unconstitutionally vague. The District Court
ruled that the Dangerous Special Offender Act is unconstitutionally
provisions. 2 The Sixth
vague both in its application and sentencing
13
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
II.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DECISION

The primary issue of concern to the Sixth Circuit was whether
the statutory provisions for an increased sentence for dangerous
special offenders are so unduly vague, overbroad, and uncertain that
the courts could not properly make the necessary finding of dangerousness' 4 or increase the defendant's sentence in an amount "not
disproportionate in severity to the maximum term"' 5 for the triggering felony, without a denial of due process as guaranteed by the fifth
amendment. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the
court cited the legislative history of the Act to demonstrate the care
with which it was drafted, the particularity of its provisions and
definitions, and the many safeguards it allows the defendant. 6 The
court ruled that the term "dangerous" is not unduly vague or uncertain, and in fact, is a common finding of the courts in the field of
ble in such courts by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, for one or more of
such convictions the defendant has been imprisoned prior to the commission of such
felony, and less than five years have elapsed between the commission of such felony
and either the defendant's release, on parole or otherwise, from imprisonment . ...
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f) (1970):
A defendant is dangerous for purposes of this section if a period of confinement longer
than that provided for such felony is required for the protection of the public from
further criminal conduct by the defendant.
12. In an unpublished order, filed May 9, 1975, by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky (Criminal 75-5), cited in United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d
at 328, n.1.
13. United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1976).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f) (1970).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970).
16. 531 F.2d at 335-36.
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criminal law.' 7 The court noted that the statute is more moderate,
and provides the defendant greater safeguards than state recidivist
statutes. The Sixth Circuit emphasized the fact that the statutory
notice does not involve a new and distinct criminal charge, but is
merely a procedure for increased sentencing which aggravates the
penalty for the most recent offense. To support its position, the
court then reverted to the general rule that an Act of Congress is
presumed constitutional. 8 In examining the facts of Stewart, the
court found that the statute could be applied in a manner which was
not violative of the defendant's constitutional right to due process.
Thus, it concluded, the statute was not void for vagueness. 9
III.

ANALYSIS

Title X is an attempt to deal with an urgent problem. The need
to protect the public from chronic criminal offenders cannot be
doubted, but urgency alone does not justify abandonment of constitutional principles or common sense. Much of the language in the
statute seems to threaten constitutional rights, if not to abridge
them directly. In the words of Representative John Conyers Jr.,
"Title X is, in blunt language, an end run around due process."2
Thus, the defendant based his argument on two contentions: (1)
that the statutory term "dangerous" is not sufficiently defined so
as to afford adequate guidelines to the sentencing judge, and (2)
that the section providing that the increased sentence may not be
disproportionate in severity to the triggering felony sentence is also
unduly vague and uncertain." The Stewart court spoke to the issue
of due process, but did not adequately answer these objections.

A. Dangerousness
It was made clear in United States v. Duardi2 and in United
States v. Kelly 23 that dangerousness is a separate element in defining a dangerous special offender. In the notice filed by the prosecutor to invoke the statute, it must be set out independently and with
particularity. It is certainly true, as the Stewart court pointed out,
that the concept of dangerousness is not a new one in the criminal
17. E.g., one of the findings a judge must make when denying bail pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3148 (1970) is that "the defendant will pose a danger to any other person or the community."
18. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
19. 531 F.2d at 337.
20. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws, supra note 7 at 4085.
21. 531 F.2d at 330..
22. 384 F. Supp. 874, 875 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
23. 384 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
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justice system."4 It is the essence of the inchoate crimes (possession,
solicitation, conspiracy), and the raison d'etre of status crimes (juvenile delinquency, vagrancy, sexual psychopathy, habitual criminalism, insanity, communism). It is the backbone of critical steps
in the criminal justice process (stop and frisk, preventive detention,
bail, and parole), and has constituted the crux of censorship under
the "clear and present danger" test. 5 In all these instances, the
defendant is penalized not for the harm he has already done, but
on the basis of a legislative, administrative, or magisterial prediction of what he might do in the future; i.e., because of his status as
dangerous.
However, in order for statutes defining these crimes to withstand constitutional scrutiny, it is the duty of the courts ". . . to
define the criteria of our prediction. To make them precise. To make
them testable. Not to leave it as a freewheeling discretion. '2 At
least two interacting questions are involved in the determination of
dangerousness: "What kinds of behavior are sufficiently threatening
to be called 'dangerous' and. . .with what degree of certainty must
the prognosis establish the likelihood of the kind or kinds of behav27
ior designated 'dangerous' occuring over what period of time? 1 It
is here that the Dangerous Special Offender Act falls, and the
Stewart court failed to supply the missing guidelines. In order to
increase a defendant's sentence by possibly twenty-five years, the
prosecution should have to produce compelling evidence of the magof its occurence and the
nitude of the danger; i.e., the probability
28
seriousness of the impending harm.
24. 531 F.2d at 336. The Stewart court cites as an example the Federal Bail Reform Act
of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1970), upheld as constitutional in Russell v. United States, 402
F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1968). However, this Act is clearly distinguishable from the Dangerous
Special Offender Act. The Bail Act involves a purely discretionary court function, in which
a finding of "dangerousness" merely denies an alleged offender his freedom on bail for a short
time. In the Act involved in the Stewart case, on the other hand, a finding of "dangerousness"
will confine the offender for as much as twenty-five years. It would seem that such a change
would require a much higher degree of statutory definition, but, in fact, the definitions in
both statutes are remarkably similar.
25. The phrase was first used by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919).
26. Seney, "A Pond as Deep as Hell" Harm, Danger and Dangerousnessin Our Criminal Law, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1095, 1129 n.99 (1971), quoting Address by Norval R. Morris,
Conference on Preventative Detention, Chicago, Oct. 1968, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION 55-56
(Urban Research Corp. ed. 1971).
27. Morris, Psychiatry & the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S.CAL. L. REV. 514, 529 (1968),
quoting Katz & Goldstein, Dangerousness & Mental Illness, 131 J. NERvOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE, 404, 409-10 (1960).
28. Seney, "A Pond as Deep as Hell" Harm, Danger and Dangerousnessin Our Criminal Law, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 569, 635 (1971).
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The Stewart court found that the statutory definition of dangerous is sufficiently precise; 9 yet it states only that a dangerous
offender is one who is likely to engage in further criminal conduct
from which the public needs protection for a longer period of time.
In attempting to construe an uncertain statutory term, the courts
have traditionally used one of the following standards: (1) the commonly accepted meaning;3" (2) the technical or special meaning;:" or
(3) the common usage. 2 The application of any of these tests fails
to remove the stigma of vagueness from this Act. There are a variety
of common meanings for "dangerous." It usually connotes physical
danger.13 One court found the term to have a commonly understood
meaning of "exposure or liability to injury, loss, pain or other evil.":"
When construing the "clear and present danger" test in Dennis v.
United States,35 the Supreme Court maintained that speech which
advocated violent overthrow of the government may be restricted,
even when the danger of such overthrow has little probability of
success, or appears doomed from the outset. The vagaries of this
"clear and present danger" test throughout Supreme Court history"
show the limitations and weaknesses of such a broad and undefined
term. It has often been employed far outside its original contextan ambiguous phrase which has been manipulated to suit the current purpose of its user.
Such a fate might well befall the term "dangerous" in Title X.
Neither the text of the statute nor the subject with which it deals
clarifies the definition. Certainly, dangerousness would involve
physical danger to the public. Would danger to property be enough?
To the social tranquility? The inclusion of the conspiratorial category of offender 37 in the statute would seem to reflect Congressional
29. 531 F.2d at 336-37.
30. E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954), (the commonly accepted
sense of "lobbyist").
31. E.g., Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925), (the special, trade
meaning of "kosher").
32. E.g., Lanzetta v. N.J., 306 U.S. 451 (1939), (no one certain meaning for "gang").
33. E.g., Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1968), (construed the term in
the D.C. Sexual Psychopath Act of 1967, 22 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3503-11 (1973), to mean one
"likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the object of the
desire").
34. Ex parte Dubois, 331 Mass. 575, 580, 120 N.E.2d 920, 923 (1954).
35. 341 U.S. 494, 503-11 (1951).
36. See generally Strong, Fifty Years of "Clearand Present Danger":From Schenck to
Brandenburg-andBeyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(3) (1970) states, in pertinent part:
A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this section if (3) such felony was, or the defendant committed such felony in furtherance of, a
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intent to punish social disorders with which conspiracies are commonly associated, as well as crimes of violence. Yet, the Stewart
decision failed to specify the boundaries of the term. The defendant
must guess at its import, as must the sentencing judge, and this is
clearly contrary to due process. 3 The Duardi decision, upon which
defendant Stewart relied, emphasized this point by stating that the
Act "does not establish any legally fixed standard and that the
language of that section is not sufficiently definite and explicit to
avoid application of the recognized constitutional rule against
vagueness."3 9
B.

Sentencing Provisions

The defendant also attacked as vague the provision that the
enhanced sentence be "for an appropriate term not to exceed
twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony."' This
phrase was not in the original bill, but was added in response to the
American Bar Association's concern that a twenty-five year seneffect, be a
tence would be given for minor felonies, and would, in
4 The Sixth
charged.
one
the
than
penalty for a different crime
Circuit did not give any criteria for determining at what point an
increased sentence becomes disproportionate. If the new sentence is
double or triple the amount thought sufficient by the legislature for
the instant offense, would this not be disproportionate? In response,
the court noted that Congress provided for appellate review of sen2
tences for the first time in federal history. This appeal process
is intended to insure that the increased sentence will not be excessive. However, neither Congress nor the Stewart case set forth the
criteria appellate courts should use to judge the appropriateness of
the sentence.
The Stewart ruling took note of the fact that the discretion
exercised by judges under the provisions of this Act is similar to that
granted by federal as well as state law, which allow judges freedom
conspiracy with three or more other persons to engage in a pattern of conduct criminal
under applicable laws of any jurisdiction, and the defendant did, or agreed that he
would, initiate, organize, plan, finance, direct, manage, or supervise all or part of such
conspiracy or conduct, or give or receive a bribe or use force as all or part of such
conduct.
38. E.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
39. 384 F. Supp. at 886. The case was decided on the basis of insufficiency of the notice,
but the court found the Act unconstitutional for vagueness as an alternate holding.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970).
41. See also U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS, supra note 7 at 4066.
42. 531 F.2d at 330-31.
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to vary a sentence for certain offenses anywhere from probation to
life.13 Most states have recidivist statutes which authorize or mandate a life sentence for habitual offenders," but Judge Phillips in
Stewart pointed out that while Title X gives the court broader sentencing choices, it affords the defendant many more constitutional
safeguards." It was the court's position that Title X is merely a new
sentencing procedure by which the maximum term prescribed for
the triggering felony can be increased by the defendant's status as
a dangerous special offender. As such, it is governed by Williams v.
New York," in which the Supreme Court exempted sentencing procedures from the rules of evidence constitutionally required at trial.
It is precisely here that Title X meets its most difficult constitutional challenge. The question, raised by opponents of the Act, is:
Is this really merely a sentencing procedure or are we in view of
the broad scope of the definition of "dangerous special offender"
. . . really giving certain defendants a more severe punishment that
others convicted of the same crime; this extra punishment being
based on reports and repute as to a great many other alleged and
unrelated acts for which they have never been tried and of which they
47
have never been found guilty.
In other words, the function of the judge, although disguised as a
sentencing role, is to assess the defendant's guilt of being a dangerous special offender. Proponents of the Act point out that this offers
greater flexibility, which is frequently lacking in the mandated sentences of the state recidivist laws. In using the state statutes, however, the trial judge need only identify the defendant, match him
with his proven record of criminal convictions, and assess the given
penalty. He does not have to determine, on an independent basis,
whether the accused is dangerous for reasons beyond his instant
conviction. There is no room for discretion in the state process.
Title X differs considerably from such a typical recidivist statute to which the Stewart court drew an analogy. Under the Act, the
thrust of the proceeding shifts from proven offenses committed by
the defendant to his status as a dangerous special offender, which
43. 531 F.2d at 332-33.
44. Statutes collected in Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 332 (1965).
Recidivist statutes were held constitutional in Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970):
In connection with the hearing, the defendant and the United States shall be entitled
to assistance of counsel, compulsory process, and cross-examination of such witnesses
as appear at the hearing.
46. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
47. Views of David Dennis (Rep. Ind.), U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws, supra note 7
at 4075.
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may be demonstrated by hearsay and by only a preponderance of
the evidence.-8 It is tempting to assume that the reason for the
statute is that the prosecution could not prove the criminal activity
in the normal way, and thus is attempting to reach the same result
through the back door by proving the minor felony and "trying" the
dangerous special offender issue by the more lenient due process
standards applicable to sentencing."
'
Congress included in the bill most of the safeguards mandated
5
by the United States Supreme Court in Specht v. Patterson' for
such a situation. In that case, the Court held that where a first
conviction is the basis for commencing another criminal proceeding,
with a possible increase in sentence, to determine whether the defendant is a threat to the public, due process requires the defendant
be accorded certain rights: the right to counsel, the right to be
heard, the right to be confronted with witnesses against him, the
right to cross-examine, and the right to present evidence of his own.
While Congress included these rights in Title X,11 it disallowed defendants two of the most important ones: the right to require the
prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
right to a trial by jury.
One of the most fundamental protections of due process in
criminal law is the reasonable doubt standard, which requires the
prosecution to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.5 3 Yet, Title X allows the trial4
court to determine guilt by a preponderance of the evidence only.
An even more basic constitutional question is whether the defendant's right to trial by jury can be denied simply by calling the
judge's function "sentencing." If "due process embodies the differing rules of fair play . . . associated with differing types of proceedings," 5 then the relative protections referred to in Specht take
on added significance in the context of the discretion given the
48. Some of that evidence may be withheld from the defendant at the trial court's
discretion. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970).
49. Testimony of Professor Peter Low, Hearings on S.30, supra note 5 at 187.
50. The Stewart court mentioned these added safeguards, 531 F.2d at 332, but failed
to explain why they were included if the mandates of Williams govern instead of Specht. Id.
at n.2.
51. 386 U.S. 605 (1967); see also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Chandler v. Fretag,
348 U.S. 3 (1954); Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966) (cited with approval
by the Specht court).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970).
53. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
54. The use of this lesser standard was raised as a central objection to the constitutionality of the statute in the Duardi decision. 384 F. Supp. at 882-83.
55. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
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judge under Title X. Heavier penalties demand equivalently greater
protection-at least equivalent to the protection given in the determination of guilt for the triggering felony. The Supreme Court has
made clear that the severity of a possible punishment is a major
factor in determining if a trial is subject to the sixth amendment
jury mandate." Title X, however, denies the defendant a jury verdict that he is a dangerous special offender, which determination
may imprison him for as much as twenty-five years, while guaranteeing him a jury trial for the triggering felony, which may be a
minor crime with a sentence of two or three years! By casting Title
X as a sentencing provision only, Congress has attempted to avoid
these constitutional pitfalls, but has only succeeded in raising grave
questions. The Stewart case has not provided satisfying answers.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to summon much concern for the habitual or professional criminals with whom this statute attempts to deal. The
problem of protecting the community from dangerous criminals, or
of reaching professional criminals who can insulate themselves from
the law, is a matter of grave concern to all of us. But this statute
seeks easy answers to these hard and complex problems. It offends
the essence of fair dealing which, under the name of due process, is
the cornerstone of American justice. The ruling of the Stewart case
will undoubtedly prove popular with a public that perceives the
courts as being too soft on criminals, placing the rights of criminals
ahead of those of the victims of crime.
It is easy to understand the mood of the public and its reflection
in the courts. But empathy is not the same as agreement. The
Stewart decision seems to represent a potentially dangerous erosion
of constitutional protections. These rights protect not only offenders, but also the innocent, from intimidation and harassment by the
state. While it is true that all the offensive potentialities of the
Dangerous Special Offender Act may be avoided by the courts, it is
clear that Title X contains few internal controls, relying entirely on
judicial discretion. Indeed, the loose definition of dangerous and the
admissibility of any conceivable type of information, proven or otherwise, under the guise of a sentencing format seems to encourage
law enforcement officials to use any method to obtain damaging
evidence of dangerousness.
A vague, overbroad statute is risky precisely because it may be
used in ways the legislature never intended. Within Title X's vague
56.

District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937).
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definition of dangerous and its failure of dLe process safeguards lies
the possibility that it could be used against anyone currently
thought to be dangerous - eccentrics, resisters, revolutionaries, innovators. In different times and different places, it could be applied
against blacks, chicanos, communists, student militants, or civil
rights workers. The vagueness of the statute could have been clarified by a judicial holding that its application must be strictly construed and narrowly applied. The Stewart court failed to do this,
leaving us with a vague, uncertain statutory requirement of
"dangerousness," the judicial determination of which "needs only
'' 7
the mumbo-jumbo of soothsayers, arrogance, and enough fear. 11
PatriciaHannegan Roll
57.

Seney, "A Pond as Deep as Hell:" supra note 28 at 637.
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